Yankees Crap Shoot

The Bombers' bats exploded at the Stadium Sunday, on a day when the good A.J. showed up. The lopsided 15-0 game was a welcome respite from a grueling Yankee week. In a simple twist of fate, Johan Santana started for the Mets and produced the worst game of his illustrious career. Nine runs in three brutal innings dropped the Mets ace's record to 8-4 and bloated his ERA to 3.29. Ironically, Phil Hughes finished for the Yanks, pitching a scoreless ninth and dropping his ERA to 5.13.

The names Santana and Hughes spark memories for Yankees' fans. In 2008 the Bombers' brain trust had the opportunity to acquire Santana for a package including Hughes, Kennedy and Cabrera. Trades take time to evaluate. Santana has earned his ace credential with the Mets. Hughes is an erratic, intriguing work in progress. Kennedy is gone but not forgotten. Cabrera bounces back to defy critics with versatile play and imagination-stretching game winning heroics.

Decision making skills are a key component in the skill set of a baseball front office. Pitching is the heartbeat of baseball. A team's fortunes will be determined by the acquisition and development of pitching talent. Yankee history is a case in point.

Recently, in an article titled, "Yankees Solve Puzzle" I wrote: "There is one familiar unanswered question, who will form the vital bridge to The Great Rivera? The front office's annual plan failed--again."

David Pinto, of the esteemed Baseball Musings, commented: "No. Pitching is a crap shoot, and relief pitchers are the ultimate small sample size, making them the ultimate crap shoot. If you judge a GM on relief pitching, you're going to fire every one of them every other year."

Sunday, Bill Madden of The New York Daily News wrote:"If it turns out that Bruney can't go, then Brian Cashman will need to get busy trolling for a dependable, pressure proven short reliever--and try to forget about the ill-advised $12 million he spent to retain Damaso Marte in the winter. An even worse mistake now would be pitching Marte to justify the investment--which ranks up there with Carl Pavano, Kei Igawa, Kyle Farnsworth, Steve Karsay, Jeff Weaver et al in Cashman's dubious judgement on pitchers."

In an effort to glean a better understanding of Cash's "trolling" technique, I consulted The Yankee Years, Tom Verducci writes: "Cashman had surrounded himself with up-and-coming assistants who were raised more on statistical analysis than heavy, old-school scouting beliefs. They were young, smart and diligent...They brought a new perspective to talent evaluation that, of course, no more solved the eternal mysteries of baseball than the old-school scouting methods had...the new Yankee philosophy hit on such minor-league free agent finds as Brian Bruney, Jose Veras, Darrell Rasner, and Edwar Ramirez." Later, Verducci documents another illustrious trail:" ...Ted Lily was hoping the Yankees would sign him. ...Lily fit the profile of a classic Yankee contributor: a left-handed pitcher who thrived in the pressure of New York and the AL East. He wanted to be a Yankee. Lilly had just won 15 games for the Toronto Blue Jays. He had no major arm issues. Cashman didn't want Lilly. He preferred Igawa.."As soon as Cash said that--Igawa was as good as Lilly--that was good enough for me," Torre said. The book goes on to chronicle Igawa's first throwing session, bullpen catcher Mike Borzello, reports: " It was awful...The changeup was horrible...His slider is not a big league pitch. His command was terrible...I hope he's hurt, so there's an explanation for throwing like that...He was terrible." More from the understated Borzello: " And after investing $200 million in payroll, why are you putting the ball in the hands of this kind of pitcher? It made no sense. But the Yankees kept making the same mistake..."

Talent evaluation in baseball is not an exact science. Mistakes happen. Cogent measure is taken over time. History speaks. If it actually is a "crap shoot" the Yankees are due for a hot roll.